१९६५ का भारत-पाक युद्ध

मुक्त ज्ञानकोश विकिपीडिया से
यहाँ जाएँ: भ्रमण, खोज


भारत और पाकिस्तान के बीच १९६५ का युद्ध
भारत पाक युद्ध का भाग
तिथि अगस्त – सितम्बर 23, 1965
स्थान भारतीय उपमहाद्वीप
परिणाम संयुक्त राष्ट्र के घोषणापत्र के द्वारा युद्धविराम .[1] सीमा क्षेत्रों मे कॊई बदलाव नही (देखें ताशकंद घोषणापत्र).
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तटस्थ आकलन[2][3]
  • ३,००० सैनिक[2]
  • न्यूनतम १७५ टैंक[2]
  • ६०-७५ वायुयान[2]
  • ७७७ कि.मी से अधिक (३०० मील) सीमाक्षेत्र पर दुश्मन का क्ब्जा

भारतीय दावा

  • ५९ वायुयान नष्ट[4]

पाकिस्तानी दावा

  • ११० वायुयान नष्ट[5]
तटस्थ आकलन[2]
  • ३,८०० सैनिक[2]
  • २०० टैंक[2]
  • २० वायुयान[2]
  • १८१३ कि.मी से अधिक (७०० मील) सीमाक्षेत्र पर दुश्मन का क्ब्जा

पाकिस्तानी दावा'

  • १९ वायुयान नष्ट

भारतीय दावा

  • ७३ वायुयान नष्ट
  • २८० टैंक नष्ट[6]

[7][8] [9]

१९६५ का भारत-पाक युद्ध उन मुठभेड़ों का नाम है जो दोनों देशों के बीच अप्रैल १९६५ से सितम्बर १९६५ के बीच हुई थी। इसे कश्मीर के दूसरे युद्ध के नाम से भी जाना जाता है। भारत और पाकिस्तान के बीच जम्मू और कश्मीर राज्य पर अधिकार के लिये बँटवारे के समय से ही विवाद चल रहा है। १९४७ में भारत-पाकिस्तान के बीच प्रथम युद्ध भी कश्मीर के लिये ही हुआ था। इस लड़ाई की शुरूआत पाकिस्तान ने अपने सैनिकों को घुसपैठियों के रूप में भेज कर इस उम्मीद में की थी कि कश्मीर की जनता भारत के खिलाफ विद्रोह कर देगी[10]। इस अभियान का नाम पाकिस्तान ने युद्धभियान जिब्राल्टर रखा था। पांच महीने तक चलने वाले इस युद्ध में दोनों पक्षों के हजारों लोग मारे गये। इस युद्ध का अंत संयुक्त राष्ट्र के द्वारा युद्ध विराम की घोषणा के साथ हुआ और ताशकंद में दोनों पक्षों में समझौता हुआ।

इस लड़ाई का अधिकांश हिस्सा दोनों पक्षों की थल सेना ने लड़ा। कारगिल युद्ध के पहले कश्मीर के विषय में कभी इतना बड़ा सैनिक जमावड़ा नहीं हुआ था। युद्ध में पैदल और बख्तरबंद टुकड़ियों ने वायुसेना की मदद से अनेक अभियानों में हिस्सा लिया। दोनो पक्षो के बीच हुए अनेक युद्धों की तरह इस युद्ध की अनेक जानकारियां दोनों पक्षों ने सार्वजनिक नहीं की।

युद्ध के पूर्व तनाव का बढना[संपादित करें]

अमेरिका के द्वारा बाद मे सार्वजनिक किया गया पत्र जिसमे जम्मू और कश्मीर मे सैकड़ो पाकिस्तानी घुसपठियो के मौजूद होने की खुफिया सूचना उसे दी गयी थी

भारत और पाकिस्तान के १९४७ में हुए बटवारे के समय से ही भारत और पाकिस्तान के बीच कई मुद्दो पर तनातनी चल रही थी हालांकि जम्मू और कश्मीर का मुद्दा इसमे सबसे बड़ा था पर अन्य सीमा विवाद भी थे इनमे सबसे प्रमुख कच्छ का रण, जो कि एक बंजर इलाका है, के बटवारे पर था। २० मार्च १९६५ में पाकिस्तान के द्वारा जानबूझ[11] कर कच्छ के रण में झडपें शुरू कर दी गयी। शुरू में इनमे केवल सीमा सुरक्षा बल ही शामिल थे पर बाद में दोनो देशों की सेना भी युद्ध में शामिल हो गयी[11] १ जून १९६५ में ब्रिटिश प्रधानमंत्री हैरोल्ड विल्सन ने दोनो पक्षो के बीच लड़ाई रुकवा कर इस विवाद को हल करने के लिये एक निष्पक्ष मध्यस्थ न्यायालय की स्थापना कर दी। इस न्यायालय ने (जिसका निर्णय तो बाद में १९६८ में आया पर रुख पहले ही स्पष्ट हो चुका था) कच्छ के रन की करीब ९०० वर्ग किलोमीटर जगह पाकिस्तान को दे दी। हालांकि पाकिस्तान का दावा ३५०० वर्ग किलोमीटर पर था। [12]

कच्छ के रन में मिली सफलता से उत्साहित पाकिस्तान के राजनेताओं खासकर तत्कालीन विदेशमंत्री ज़ुल्फिकार अली भुट्टो ने राष्ट्र्पति और सेनाध्यक्ष जनरल अयूब खान पर दबाव डाला कि वे कश्मीर पर हमले का आदेश दे। भारत उस समय चीन[13] से युद्ध हार चुका था और उनका मानना था कि भारत उस समय युद्ध करने की स्थिति में नहीं था। इसके अलावा भुट्टो और उनके विचार से सहमत अन्य जनरलो याह्या खान और टिक्का खान का यह भी मानना था कि कश्मीर की जनता भारत से आजाद होकर पाकिस्तान से विलय की इच्छुक है और सैनिको को घुसपैठियों के वेश में भेजने पर उनके समर्थन में विद्रोह कर देगी। आखिर जनरल अयूब खान दबाव में आ गये और उन्होने गुप्त सैनिक अभियान ऑपरेशन जिब्राल्टर[14] का आदेश दे दिया। इस अभियान का मुख्य उद्देश्य कश्मीर की जनता में विद्रोह भड़काना और भारतीय संचारतंत्र एवं परिवहन व्यवस्था को नुकसान पहुचाना था। पाकिस्तान के घुसपैठियों को जल्दी ही पहचान लिया गया और विद्रोह करने के बजाय जनता ने उनकी सूचना भारतीय सैनिकों को दे दी और यह अभियान पूर्णतः विफल हो गया।

यु्द्ध[संपादित करें]

५ अगस्त १९६५ को २६००० से ३०००० के बीच पाकिस्तानी सैनिकों ने कश्मीर की स्थानीय आबादी की वेषभूषा में नियंत्रण रेखा को पार कर भारतीय कश्मीर में प्रवेश कर लिया। भारतीय सेना ने स्थानीय आबादी से इसकी सूचना पाकर १५ अगस्त को नियंत्रण रेखा को पार किया। [13]

सेनाध्यक्ष पाकिस्तान, जनरल मुहम्मद मूसा खान कब्जे मे लिये गये भारतीय क्षेत्र खेमकरण के रेल भवन मे भारत

शुरुआत में भारतीय सेना को अच्छी सफलता मिली। उसने तोपखाने की मदद से तीन महत्वपूर्ण पहाड़ी ठिकानो पर कब्जा जमा लिया। पाकिस्तान ने टिथवाल, उरी और पुंछ क्षेत्रों में महत्वपूर्ण बढत कर ली पर १८ अगस्त को पाकिस्तानी अभियान की ताकत में काफी कमी आ गयी थी। भारतीय अतिरिक्त टुकड़िया लाने में सफल हो गये और भारत ने पाकिस्तान के कब्जे वाले कश्मीर में ८ किलोमीटर अंदर घुस कर हाजी पीर दर्रे पर कब्जा कर लिया। इस कब्जे से पाकिस्तान सकते में आ गया। अभियान जिब्राल्टर के घुसपैठिये सनिकों का रास्ता भारतीयों के कब्जे में आ गया था और अभियान विफल हो गया। यही नहीं, पाकिस्तान की कमान को लगने लगा कि पाकिस्तानी कश्मीर का महत्वपूर्ण शहर मुजफ्फराबाद अब भारतीयो के कब्जे में जाने ही वाला है। मुजफ्फराबाद पर दबाव कम करने के लिये पाकिस्तान ने एक नया अभियान ऑपरेशन ग्रैंड स्लैम शुरू किया।

१ सितम्बर १९६५ को पाकिस्तान ने ग्रैंड स्लैम नामक एक अभियान के तहत सामरिक द्रुष्टी से महत्वपूर्ण शहर अखनूर जम्मू और कश्मीरपर कब्जे के लिये आक्रमण कर दिया। इस अभियान का उद्देश्य कश्मीर घाटी का शेष भारत से संपर्क तोड था ताकि उसकी रसद और संचार वय्वस्था भंग कर दी जाय। पाकिस्तान के इस आक्रमण के लिये भारत तैयार नहीं था और पाकिस्तान को भारी संख्या में सैनिको और बेहतर किस्म के टैंको का लाभ मिल रहा था। शुरूवात में भारत को भारी क्षती उठानी पड़ी इस पर भारतीय सेना ने हवाई हमले का उपयोग किया इसके जवाब में पाकिस्तान ने पंजाब और श्रीनगर के हवाई ठिकानो पर हमला कर दिया। युद्ध के इस चरण में पाकिस्तान अत्यधिक बेहतर स्थिती में था और इस अप्रत्याशित हमले से भारतीय खेमे में घबराहट फैल गयी थी। अखनूर के पाकिस्तानी सेना के हाथ में जाने से भारत के लिये कश्मीर घाटी मे हार का खतरा पैदा हो सकता था। ग्रैंड स्लैम के विफल होने की दो वजहे थी सबसे पहली और बड़ी वजह यह थी कि पाकिस्तान की सैनिक कमान ने जीत के मुहाने में पर अपने सैनिक कमांडर को बदल दिया ऐसे में पाकिस्तानी सेना को आगे बढने में एक दिन की देरी हो गयी और उन २४ घंटो में भारत को अखनूर की रक्षा के लिये अतिरिक्त सैनिक और सामान लाने का मौका मिल गया खुद भारर्तीय सेना के स्थानीय कमांडर भौचक्के थे कि पाकिस्तान इतनी आसान जीत क्यों छोड़ रहा है। एक दिन की देरी के बावजूद भारत के पश्चिमी कमान के सेना प्रमुख यह जानते थे कि पाकिस्तान बहुत बेहतर स्थिती में है और उसको रोकने के लिये उन्होने यह प्रस्ताव तत्कालीन सेनाध्यक्ष जनरल चौधरी को दिया कि पंजाब सीमा में एक नया मोर्चा खोल कर लाहौर पर हमला कर दिया जाय। जनरल चौधरी इस बात से सहमत नहीं थे लेकिन तत्कालीन प्रधानमंत्री लाल बहादुर शाष्त्री ने उनकी बात अनसुनी कर इस हमले का आदेश दे दिया।

ब्रिगेडियर हरी सिंह, जो उस समय प्रथम भारतीय बख्तरबंद डिविजन की१८वीं यूनिट) में सैनिक थे, लाहौर जिले में बरकी पुलिस थाने के बाहर

भारत ने ६ सितम्बर को अंतर्राष्ट्रीय सीमा रेखा को पार कर पश्चिमी मोर्चे पर हमला कर युद्ध की आधिकारिक शुरूवात कर दी[15]। ६ सितम्बर को भारत की १५वी पैदल सैन्य इकाई ने द्वितीय विश्व युद्ध के अनुभवी मेजर जनरल प्रसाद के नेत्रत्व में इच्छोगिल नहर के पश्चिमी किनारे में पाकिस्तान के बड़े हमले का सामना किया। इच्छोगिल नहर भारत और पाकिस्तान की वास्तविक सीमा थी। इस हमले में खुद मेजर जनरल प्रसाद के काफिले पर भी हमला हुआ और उन्हे अपना वाहन छोड़ कर भागना पड़ा। भारत ने प्रतिआअक्रमण में बरकी गांव के समीप नहर को पार करने में सफलता अर्जित कर ली। इससे भारतीय सेना लाहौर के हवाई अडडे पर हमला करने की सीमा में पहुच गयी इसके परिणामस्वरूप अमेरिका ने अपने नागरिकों को लाहौर से निकालने के लिये कुछ समय के लिये युद्धविराम की अपील की। इसी बीच पाकिस्तान ने लाहौर पर दबाव को कम करने के लिये खेमकरण पर हमला कर उस पर कब्जा कर लिया बदले में भारत ने बेदियां और उसके आस पास के गावों पर हमला कर दिया।

६ सितम्बर को लाहौर पर हमले में भारतीय सेना के प्रथम पैदल सैन्य खन्ड (इनफैंट्री डिविजन) के साथ द्वितीय बख्तरबंद उपखन्ड (ब्रिगेड) के तीन टैंक दस्ते शामिल थे। वे तुरंत ही सीमा पार करके इच्छोगिल नहर पहुच गये पाकिस्तानी सेना ने पुलियाओं पर रक्षा दस्ते तैनात कर दिये जिन पुलो को बचाया नहीं जा सकता था उनको उड़ा दिया गया पाकिस्तान के इस कदम से भारतीय सेना का आगे बढना रुक गया। जाट रेजीमेंट की एक इकाई 3 जाट ने नहर पार करके डोगराई और बातापोर पर कब्जा कर लिया[16]। उसी दिन पाकिस्तानी सेना ने बख्तरबंद इकाई और वायुसेना की मदद से भारतीय सेना की १५वे खन्ड पर बड़ा प्रतिआक्रमण किया हालाकि इससे ३ जाट को मामूली नुकसान ही हुआ लेकिन १५वे खन्ड को पीछे हटना पड़ा और उसके रसद और हथियारो के वाहनो को काफी क्षती पहुची। भारतीय सेना के बड़े अधिकारियो को जमीनी हालात की सही जानकारी नहीं थी अतः उन्होने इस आशंका से कि ३ जाट को भी भारी नुकसान हुआ है उसे पीछे हटने का आदेश दे दिया इससे ३ जाट के कमान आधिकारी को बड़ी निराशा हुई[17] और बाद में उन्हे डोगराई पर फिर कब्जा करने के लिये बड़ी कीमत चुकानी पड़ी।

[[चित्|thumb|left| खेमकरण के पास पाकिस्तानी सेना के नष्ट और भारत द्वारा कब्जे मे लिये हुये पैटन और शरमन टैंक। करीब ९७ टैंक अासल उत्ताड़ के युद्ध में भारतीयों के कब्जे मे आ गये थे। [18][19]]]

८ दिसम्बर १९६५ को ५ मराठा लाईट इनफ़ैन्ट्री का एक दस्ता रणनीतिक रूप से महत्वपूर्ण कस्बे मुनाबाव में तैनात राजस्थान सैन्य बल कॊ मजबूती प्रदान करने के लिये भेजा गया। उनको पाकिस्तानी सेना के पैदल द्स्ते को आगे बढने से रोकने का आदेश मिला था पर वे केवल अपनी चौकी की रक्षा ही कर पाये पाकिस्तानी सेना के तोपखाने से हुई भारी बमबारी और हवाई और पैदल सैन्य आक्रमण के बीच ५ मराठा के जवानो ने बड़ी वीरता का परिचय दिया परिणाम स्वरूप आज उस चौकी कॊ मराठा हिल के नाम से जाना जाता है। ५ मराठा की मदद के लिये भेजे गये ३ गुरखा और ९५४ भारी तोपखाना का दस्ता पाकिस्तानी वायु सेना के भारी हमले के कारण पहुच नहीं पाया और रसद ले कर बारमेर से आ रही ट्रैन भी गर्दा रोड रेल अड्डे के पास हमले का शिकार हो गयी १० सितम्बर को मुनाबाओ पर पाकिस्तान का कब्जा हो गया।[20]

९ सितम्बर के बाद की घटनाओं ने दोनो देशों की सेनाओ के सबसे गर्वित खन्डो का दंभ चूर चूर कर दिया। भारत के १ बख्तरबंद खन्ड जिसे भारतीय सेना की शान कहा जाता था ने सियालकोट की दिशा में हमला कर दिया। छाविंडा में पाकिस्तान की अपेक्षाकृत कमजोर ६ बख्तरबंद खन्ड ने बुरी तरह हरा दिया भारतीय सेना को करीब करीब १०० टैंक गवाने पड़े और पीछे हटने पर मजबूर होना पड़ा। इससे उत्साहित होकर पाकिस्तान की सेना ने भारतीयों पर प्रतिआक्रमण कर दिया और भारतीय सीमा में आगे घुस आयी। अपने अंतिम आक्रामक के लिये पाकिस्तान अपने पहला बख़्तरबंद डिवीजन और 11वाँ इन्फैन्ट्री डिवीजन के साथ अमृतसर पर कब्जे के इरादे से खेमकरण पर हमला कर दिया। उनके अनुसार अमृतसर के बाद जालंधर और फिर राष्ट्रपति अयूब खान की तरफ से आये बयान के अनुसार दिल्ली अगला लक्ष्य होता।[21] पाकिस्तानी सेना खेमकरण से आगे बढती ही कि असल उत्तर गाँव (पंजाबी: ਆਸਲ ਉਤਾੜ)[22]) के पास भारत का चौथा माउंटेन डिवीजन, 7 माउंटेन ब्रिगेड, 62 माउंटेन ब्रिगेड, शेरमेन टैंक से सुसज्जित डेक्कन हॉर्स, अपने अन्य डिवीजन के साथ युद्ध के लिये खडा था। और यहाँ इन दोनों के बीच दुसरें विश्वयुध्द के बाद सबसे बड़ी टैंक की लड़ाई लड़ी गई, जिसमें पाकिस्तान कि जबरदस्त हार हुई। उसनें अपने 97 टैंक खो दिये, जिसमें 72 पैटन टैंक शामिल थे; इसके अलावा 32 टैंक चलती हालत में कब्जा कर लिया गया।[21] जहाँ इससे पहले आगे चल रही पाकिस्तानी सेना असल उत्तर के युध्द में हारने से भारत के पक्ष में युद्ध का संतुलन झुक गया।[21] इसके बाद यह जगह अमेरिका में बने पैटन नाम के पाकिस्तानी टैंको के ऊपर पैटन नगर के नाम से जाना जाने लगा। इस लड़ाई के बाद पाकिस्तान की पहली बख्तरबंद डिवीजन को वापस सियालकोट भेज दिया गया जहाँ फिर उसने युद्ध में आगे भाग नहीं लिया।

इस समय तक युद्ध में ठहराव आ गया था और दोनो देश अपने द्वारा जीते हुए इलाको की रक्षा में ज्यादा ध्यान दे रहे थे। लड़ाई में भारतीय सेना के ३००० और पाकिस्तानी सेना के ३८०० जवान शहीद हो चुके थे। भारत ने युद्ध में ७१० वर्ग किलोमीटर इलाके में और पाकिस्तान ने २१० वर्ग किलोमीटर इलाके में कब्जा कर लिया था। भारत के क्ब्जे में सियालकोट, लाहौर और कश्मीर के उपजाऊ इलाके थे,[23] जबकि पाकिस्तान के कब्जे में सिंध और छंब के बंजर इलाके थे। [24]

हवाई युद्ध[संपादित करें]

इस युद्ध में आजादी के बाद पहली बार भारतीय वायु सेना (आईएएफ) एवं पाकिस्तानी वायु सेना (पीएएफ) के विमानों ने एक दुसरे का मुकाबला किया। इससे पहले इन दोनों वायु-सेनाओं ने १९४० के दशक में प्रथम कश्मीर युद्ध में हिस्सा लिया था जिसमें कि १९६५ युद्ध की तुलना में इनका योगदान बहुत कम और केवल परिवहन तक ही सीमित था।

भारतीय वायु सेना के पास बड़ी संख्या में हॉकर हंटर, भारत में निर्मित फॉलैंड नैट, दे हैविलैंड वैंपायर, इ इ कैनबरा बमवर्षक और मिग-21 की एक स्क्वाड्रन थी। पाकिस्तानी वायु सेना के फाडटर प्लेन थे- 102 F-86F सैबर और 12 F-104 स्टारफाइटर, और 24 B-57 कैनबरा बमवर्षक। संघर्ष के दौरान भारत और पकिस्तान वायु सेनाओं का अनुपात 5:1 था।[25] हलांकि युद्ध में दोनों वायुसेनाएं समान थीं, क्योंकि चीन के युद्ध में प्रवेश करने की संभावना से बचने के लिए अधिकतर भारतीय वायु सेना पूर्व की ओर तैनात थी।[26]

पाकिस्तानी विमान ज्यादातर अमेरिकी थे, जबकि भारत के पास सोवियत व यूरोपीय विमानों का मिला जुला बेड़ा था। ऐसा बहुत प्रसारित था कि पाकिस्तान के अमेरिकी विमान भारत के विमानों से बेहतर हैं, लेकिन किछ विशेषज्ञों के अनुसार यह सही नहीं था क्योंकि भारतीय वायु सेना के मिग 21, हॉकर हंटर और फॉलैंड नैट फाइटर की परफॉर्मेंस उनके प्रतिद्वंद्वी पाकिस्तान के F-86 सैबर से बेहतर थी।[27] युद्ध में पाकिस्तान की नं० १९ स्क्वाड्रन का नेतृत्व करने वाले एयर कमांडर (सेवानिवृत्त) सज्जाद हैदर के अनुसार- हालाँकि भारतीय वायुसेना के वैंपायर फाइटर विमान F-86 सैबर के मुकाबले पुराने और कमज़ोर थे, लेकिन हंटर विमान शक्ति एवं गति दोनों में ही उनसे बेहतर थे।[28]

भारतीयों के अनुसार F-86 छोटे से फॉलैंड नैट (Folland Gnat) के सामने कमज़ोर था जिसके कारण इन विमानों को "सैबर नाशक" कहा जाने लगा था।[29] पाकिस्तान वायुसेना का F-104 स्टारफाइटर उपमहाद्वीप में उस समय का सबसे तेज गति का फाइटर विमान था और उसे प्रायः "पाकिस्तान वायुसेना का गर्व" कहा जाता था। लेकिन सज्जाद हैदर के अनुसार वे विमान इस सम्मान के लायक नहीं थे क्योंकि ये "४०,००० फीट से अधिक की ऊंचाई पर उड़ने वाले सोवियत बमवर्षकों को रोकने व मुकाबला करने के उ्देश्य" से बने थे, ना कि कम ऊँचाई पर तेज तर्रार फाइटर विमानों के साथ लड़ने के लिये। अतः ये उस समय के माहौल के उपयुक्त नहीं थे।"[30] भारतीय वायुसेना स्टारफाइटर की वजह से चिंतित थी,[30] किंतु लड़ाई में ये उतने प्रभावी साबित नहीं हुए जितने कि कहीं अधिक धीमे किंतु कहीं अधिक फुर्तीले,फॉलैंड नैट फाइटर।[31][32] फिर भी सैबर और नैट्स के बीच चले द्वंद युद्ध में सुपरसोनिक गति के साथ, सैबर कही ज्यादा सफल रहा।

चित्र:PAF gallery.jpg
Indian Folland Gnat on display at the PAF Museum Gallery.

दोनों देशों ने लड़ाई में हुए नुकसान के एक-दूसरे के विपरीत दावे किए हैं तथा कुछ ही तटस्थ सूत्रों ने उनका सत्यापन किया है। पाकिस्तानी वायुसेना का दावा था कि उसने भारत के 104 विमान गिराए और अपने 19 विमान खोए, जबकि भारतीय वायुसेना ने दावा किया कि उन्होंने पाकिस्तान के 73 विमान गिराए और अपने 35 विमान खोए।[33] एक तटस्थ स्रोत के अनुसार, युद्ध समाप्ति के शीघ्र बाद ही हुई एक परेड में पाकिस्तानी वायुसेना ने 86 F-86 सैबर, 10 F-104 स्टारफाइटर, और 20 B-57 कैनबरा विमान उड़ाए जिससे कि भारतीय वायुसेना का 73 पाकिस्तानी विमान गिराने का दावा गलत प्रतीत होता है, जो कि उस समय पाकिस्तान की लड़ाकू विमानों की लगभग संपूर्ण प्रथम पंक्ति थी। [34]

पकिस्तान वायुसेना के केवल एक स्क्वाड्रन को खोने के दावों को, भारतीय सूत्रों ने नकारते हुए बताया है कि, पाकिस्तान ने शुरूआती युद्ध के 10 दिनों के भीतर ही इंडोनेशिया, इराक, ईरान, तुर्की और चीन से अतिरिक्त विमान हासिल करने की मांग की थी।

स्वतंत्र सूत्रों के अनुसार, पीएएफ ने कुछ 20 विमान खो दिए थे जबकि भारतीयों ने 60-75 विमान खो दिये थे। पाकिस्तान ने युद्ध की समाप्ति तक अपनी 17 प्रतिशत अग्रिम पंक्ति की ताकत खो दी, जबकि भारत का नुकसान 10 प्रतिशत से भी कम था। इसके अलावा, यह अनुमान लगाया गया है कि यदि संघर्ष तीन सप्ताह तक और चलती तो पाकिस्तानी नुकसान में 33 प्रतिशत की और बढ़ोतरी होती और भारत का नुकसान 15 प्रतिशत होता।

टैंक युद्ध[संपादित करें]

thumb|right|Tanks of 18th Cavalry (Indian Army) on the move during the 1965 Indo-Pak War.

1965 के युद्ध में द्वितीय विश्वयुद्ध के बाद टैंकों के सबसे बड़े युद्ध लड़े गए। . At the beginning of the war, the Pakistani Army had both a numerical advantage in tanks, as well as better equipment overall.[35] Pakistani armour was largely American-made; it consisted mainly of Patton M-47 and M-48 tanks, but also included many M4 Sherman tanks, some M24 Chaffee light tanks and M36 Jackson tank destroyers, equipped with 90 mm guns.[36] The bulk of India's tank fleet were older M4 Sherman tanks; some were up-gunned with the French high velocity CN 75 50 guns and could hold their own, whilst some older models were still equipped with the inferior 75 mm M3 L/40 gun. Besides the M4 tanks, भारत fielded the British-made Centurion Tank Mk 7, with the 105 mm Royal Ordnance L7 gun, and the AMX-13, PT-76, and M3 Stuart light tanks. Pakistan fielded a greater number and more modern artillery; its guns out-ranged those of the Indian artillery, according to Pakistan's Major General T.H. Malik.[37]

At the outbreak of war in 1965, Pakistan had about 15 armoured cavalry regiments, each with about 45 tanks in three squadrons. Besides the Pattons, there were about 200 M4 Shermans re-armed with 76 mm guns, 150 M24 Chaffee light tank and a few independent squadrons of M36B1 tank destroyers. Most of these regiments served in Pakistan's two armoured divisions, the 1st and 6th Armoured divisions – the latter being in the process of formation.

The Indian Army of the time possessed 17 cavalry regiments, and in the 1950s had begun modernizing them by the acquisition of 164 AMX-13 light tanks and 188 Centurions. The remainder of the cavalry units were equipped with M4 Shermans and a small number of M3A3 Stuart light tanks. India had only a single armoured division, the 1st 'Black Elephant' Armoured Division, also called 'Fakhr-i-Hind' ('Pride of India'), which consisted of the 17th Cavalry (The Poona Horse), the 4th Hodson's Horse, the 16th 'Black Elephant' Cavalry, the 7th Light Cavalry, the 2nd Lancers, the 18th Cavalry and the 62nd Cavalry, the two first named being equipped with Centurions. There was also the 2nd Independent Armoured Brigade, one of whose three regiments, the 3rd Cavalry, was also equipped with Centurions.

Despite the qualitative and numerical superiority of Pakistani armour,[38] Pakistan was outfought on the battlefield by India, which made progress into the Lahore-Sialkot sector, whilst halting Pakistan's counteroffensive on Amritsar.;[39][40] they were sometimes employed in a faulty manner, such as charging prepared defenses during the defeat of Pakistan's 1st Armoured Division at Assal Uttar.

चित्र:ChawindaBattel.jpg
Pakistani soldiers during the Battle of Chawinda. Brigadier A.A.K. Niazi, (3rd from left) observing a map

Although India's tank formations experienced same results, भारत's attack at the Battle of Chawinda, led by its 1st Armored Division and supporting units, was brought to a grinding halt by the newly raised 6th Armoured Division (ex-100th independent brigade group) in the Chawinda sector. The Indians lost 120 tanks at Chawinda.[41] One true winner to emerge was India's Centurion battle tank, with its 105 mm gun and heavy armour, which proved superior to the overly complex Pattons and their exaggerated reputations.[40] However, in the Sialkot sector outnumbered Pattons performed exceedingly well in the hands of the 25th Cavalry and other regiments of the 6th Armoured Division, which exacted a disproportionately heavy toll of Centurions from the Poona Horse and Hodson's Horse. The Indian Army has made much of the fact that some of its Centurions survived repeated hits; yet have failed to point out that the majority of tanks in the Sialkot sector were Shermans whose guns were inadequate even in 1944. Neither the Indian nor Pakistani Army showed any great facility in the use of armoured formations in offensive operations, whether the Pakistani 1st Armoured Division at Asal Uttar or the Indian 1st Armoured Division at Chawinda. In contrast, both proved adept with smaller forces in a defensive role such a the 2nd Armoured Brigade at Asal Uttar and the 25th Cavalry at Chawinda, where they defeated their better equipped but clumsier foes

नौसैनिक युद्ध[संपादित करें]

The navies of India and Pakistan did not play a prominent role in the war of 1965, although Pakistani accounts dispute this.[42] On September 7, a flotilla of the Pakistani Navy carried out a small scale bombardment of the Indian coastal town and radar station of Dwarka, which was 200 miles (300 km) south of the Pakistani port of Karachi. Codenamed Operation Dwarka, it did not fulfill its primary objective of disabling the radar station and there was no immediate retaliatory response from India. Later, some of the Indian fleet sailed from Bombay to Dwarka to patrol the area and deter further bombardment. Foreign authors have noted that the "insignificant bombardment"[43] of the town was a "limited engagement, with no strategic value."[42]

According to some Pakistani sources, one submarine, PNS Ghazi, kept the Indian Navy's aircraft carrier INS Vikrant besieged in Bombay throughout the war. Indian sources claim that it was not their intention to get into a naval conflict with Pakistan, and wished to restrict the war to a land-based conflict.[44] Moreover, they note that the Vikrant was in dry dock in the process of refitting. Some Pakistani defence writers have also discounted claims that the Indian Navy was bottled up in Bombay by a single submarine, instead stating that 75% of the Indian Navy was under maintenance in harbour.[45]

खुफिया ऑपरेशन[संपादित करें]

The Pakistan Army launched a number of covert operations to infiltrate and sabotage Indian airbases.[46] On September 7, 1965, the Special Services Group (SSG) commandos were parachuted into enemy territory. According to Chief of Army Staff General Musa Khan, about 135 commandos were airdropped at three Indian airfields(Halwara, Pathankot and Adampur). The daring attempt proved to be an "unmitigated disaster".[46] Only 22 commandos returned to Pakistan as planned, 93 were taken prisoner (including one of the Commanders of the operations, Major Khalid Butt), and 20 were killed in encounters with the army, police or civilians[47] The reason for the failure of the commando mission is attributed to the failure to provide maps, proper briefings and adequate planning or preparation[48]

Despite failing to sabotage the airfields, Pakistan sources claim that the commando mission affected some planned Indian operations. As the Indian 14th Infantry Division was diverted to hunt for paratroopers, the Pakistan Air Force found the road filled with transport, and destroyed many vehicles.[49]

India responded to the covert activity by announcing rewards for captured Pakistani spies or paratroopers.[50] Meanwhile, in Pakistan, rumors spread that India had retaliated with its own covert operations, sending commandos deep into Pakistan territory,[48] but these rumors were later determined to be unfounded.[51]

नुकसान का आकलन[संपादित करें]

अपनी और दूसरे की हानि के बारे में भारत और पाकिस्तान दोनों ने बिल्कुल बेमेल दावे किए। दोनों देशों के दावों की संक्षिप्त सारणी इस प्रकार है

भारत का दावा[52] पाकिस्तान का दावा[53] स्वतंत्र स्रोत[13][54]
हताहत  –  – 3,000 भारतीय सैनिक, 3,800 पाकिस्तानी सैनिक
Combat flying effort 4,073+ combat sorties 2,279 combat sorties
वायुयानों का नुकसान 35 भारतीय वायु सेना (आधिकारिक), 73 पाकिस्तानी वायु सेना.अन्य स्रोत[55] based on the Official Indian Armed Forces History[56] put actual IAF losses at 30 including 19 accidents (non combat sortie rate is not known) and PAF's combat losses alone at 43. 19 PAF, 104 IAF 20 PAF, Pakistan claims India rejected neutral arbitration.[57][58]
Aerial victories 17 + 3 (post war) 30  –
टैंक नष्ट 128 भारतीय टैंक, 152 पाकिस्तानी टैंक पकड़े, 150 पाकिस्तानी टैंकनष्ट. Officially 471 Pakistani tanks destroyed and 38 captured[कृपया उद्धरण जोड़ें] 165 पाकिस्तानी टैंक[59]
भूमिक्षेत्र विजित 1,500 mi2 (3,885 km2) पाकिस्तानी भूमि 250 mi² (648 km²) भारतीय भूमि भारत के पास 710 वर्ग मील mi²(1,840 किमी²) पाकिस्तानी भूमि और पाकिस्तान के पास 210 वर्ग मील (545 वर्ग किमी) भारतीय भूमि

=[संपादित करें]

There have been several neutral assessments of the losses incurred by both India and Pakistan during the war. Most of these assessments agree that India had a upper hand over Pakistan when ceasefire was declared. Some of the neutral assessments are mentioned below —

The war was militarily inconclusive; each side held prisoners and some territory belonging to the other. Losses were relatively heavy—on the Pakistani side, twenty aircraft, 200 tanks, and 3,800 troops. Pakistan's army had been able to withstand Indian pressure, but a continuation of the fighting would only have led to further losses and ultimate defeat for Pakistan. Most Pakistanis, schooled in the belief of their own martial prowess, refused to accept the possibility of their country's military defeat by "Hindu India" and were, instead, quick to blame their failure to attain their military aims on what they considered to be the ineptitude of Ayub Khan and his government.

  • TIME magazine reported that India held 690 mi2 of Pakistan territory while Pakistan held 250 mi2 of Indian territory in Kashmir and Rajasthan. Additionally, Pakistan had lost almost half its armour temporarily.[61] The article further elaborates —

Severely mauled by the larger Indian armed forces, Pakistan could continue the fight only by teaming up with Red China and turning its back on the U.N.

  • Devin T. Hagerty wrote in his book "South Asia in world politics"[62] –

The invading Indian forces outfought their Pakistani counterparts and halted their attack on the outskirts of Lahore, Pakistan's second-largest city. By the time संयुक्त राष्ट्र intervened on September 22, Pakistan had suffered a clear defeat.

  • In his book "National identity and geopolitical visions",[63] Gertjan Dijkink writes –

The superior Indian forces, however, won a decisive victory and the army could have even marched on into Pakistani territory had external pressure not forced both combatants to cease their war efforts.

In three weeks the second Indo-Pak War ended in what appeared to be a draw when the embargo placed by Washington on U.S. ammunition and replacements for both armies forced cessation of conflict before either side won a clear victory. India, however, was in a position to inflict grave damage to, if not capture, Pakistan's capital of the Punjab when the cease-fire was called, and controlled Kashmir's strategic Uri-Poonch bulge, much to Ayub's chagrin.

  • In his book titled The greater game: India's race with destiny and China, David Van Praagh wrote[65] –

India won the war. It gained 1,840 square kilometers of Pakistani territory: 640 square kilometers in Azad Kashmir, Pakistan's portion of the state; 460 square kilometers of the Sailkot sector; 380 square kilometers far to the south of Sindh; and most critical, 360 square kilometers on the Lahore front. Pakistan took 540 square kilometers of Indian territory: 490 square kilometers in the Chhamb sector and 50 square kilometers around Khem Karan. these are not correct pls review

  • Dennis Kux's "India and the United States estranged democracies" also provides a summary of the war[66]

Although both sides lost heavily in men and material, and neither gained a decisive military advantage, भारत had the better of the war. नई दिल्ली achieved its basic goal of thwarting Pakistan's attempt to seize Kashmir by force. Pakistan gained nothing from a conflict which it had instigated.

  • "A region in turmoil: South Asian conflicts since 1947" by Robert Johnson mentions[67] –

India's strategic aims were modest – it aimed to deny Pakistani Army victory, although it ended up in possession of 720 वर्ग मील (1,900 कि॰मी2) of Pakistani territory for the loss of just 220 वर्ग मील (570 कि॰मी2) of its own.

  • An excerpt from William M. Carpenter and David G. Wiencek's "Asian security handbook: terrorism and the new security environment"[68] –

A brief but furious 1965 war with India began with a covert Pakistani thrust across the Kashmiri cease-fire line and ended up with the city of Lahore threatened with encirclement by Indian Army. Another UN-sponsored cease-fire left borders unchanged, but Pakistan's vulnerability had again been exposed.

  • English historian John Keay's "India: A History" provides a summary of the 1965 war[69] –

The 1965 Indo-Pak war lasted barely a month. Pakistan made gains in the Rajasthan desert but its main push against India's Jammu-Srinagar road link was repulsed and Indian tanks advanced to within a sight of Lahore. Both sides claimed victory but India had most to celebrate.

  • Uk Heo and Shale Asher Horowitz write in their book "Conflict in Asia: Korea, China-Taiwan, and India-Pakistan"[70] –

Again India appeared, logistically at least, to be in a superior position but neither side was able to mobilize enough strength to gain a decisive victory.

  • Newsweek magazine, however, praised the Pakistani military's ability to hold of the much larger Indian Army.[71]

By just the end of the week, in fact, it was clear that the Pakistanis were more than holding their own.

युद्धविराम[संपादित करें]

The United States and the Soviet Union used significant diplomatic tools to prevent any further escalation in the conflict between the two South Asian nations. The Soviet Union, led by Premier Alexei Kosygin, hosted ceasefire negotiations in Tashkent (now in Uzbekistan), where Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistani President Ayub Khan signed the Tashkent Agreement, agreeing to withdraw to pre-August lines no later than February 25, 1966.

With declining stockpiles of ammunition, Pakistani leaders feared the war tilting in India's favor. Therefore, they quickly accepted the ceasefire in Tashkent.[72] Despite strong opposition from Indian military leaders, भारत budged to growing international diplomatic pressure and accepted the ceasefire.[72] On September 22, the संयुक्त राष्ट्र Security Council unanimously passed a resolution that called for an unconditional ceasefire from both nations. The war ended the following day.

India's Prime Minister, Shastri, suffered a fatal heart attack soon after the declaration of the ceasefire. As a consequence, the public outcry in India against the ceasefire declaration transformed into a wave of sympathy for the ruling Indian National Congress.[73] The ceasefire was criticized by many Pakistanis who, relying on fabricated official reports and the controlled Pakistani press, believed that the leadership had surrendered military gains. The protests led to student riots.[74] Pakistan State's reports had suggested that their military was performing admirably in the war – which they incorrectly blamed as being initiated by India – and thus the Tashkent Declaration was seen as having forfeited the gains.[75] Some recent books written by Pakistani authors, including one by ex-ISI chief titled "The Myth of 1965 Victory",[76] allegedly exposed Pakistani fabrications about the war, but all copies of the book were bought by Pakistan Army to prevent publication because the topic was "too sensitive".[77][78]

India and Pakistan accused each other of ceasefire violations; India charged Pakistan with 585 violations in 34 days, while Pakistan countered with accusations of 450 incidents by India.[79] In addition to the expected exchange of small arms and artillery fire, भारत reported that Pakistan utilized the ceasefire to capture the Indian village of Chananwalla in the Fazilka sector. This village was recaptured by Indian troops on 25 December. On October 10, a B-57 Canberra on loan to the PAF was damaged by 3 SA-2 missiles fired from the IAF base at Ambala.[80] A Pakistani Army Auster was shot down on 16 दिसम्बर killing one Pakistani army captain and on 2 फ़रवरी 1967, an AOP was shot down by IAF Hunters.

The ceasefire remained in effect until the start of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971.

खुफिया तंत्र की विफलता[संपादित करें]

भारत और पाकिस्तान दोनों की तरफ से हुई कई रणनीतिक गलतियों के कारण यह युद्ध बेनतीजा सी स्थिति में आ पहुँचा।

भारत के गलत आकलन[संपादित करें]

Indian military intelligence gave no warning of the impending Pakistan invasion. The Indian Army failed to recognize the presence of heavy Pakistani artillery and armaments in Chumb and suffered significant losses as a result.

The "Official History of the 1965 War", drafted by the Ministry of Defence of India in 1992, was a long suppressed document that revealed other miscalculations. According to the document, on September 22 when the Security Council was pressing for a ceasefire, the Indian Prime Minister asked commanding Gen. Chaudhuri if India could possibly win the war, were he to delay accepting the ceasefire. The general replied that most of India's frontline ammunition had been used up and the Indian Army had suffered considerable tank losses. It was determined later that only 14% of India's frontline ammunition had been fired and India held twice the number of tanks as Pakistan. By this time, the Pakistani Army had used close to 80% of its ammunition.

Air Chief Marshal (retd) P.C. Lal, who was the Vice Chief of Air Staff during the conflict, points to the lack of coordination between the IAF and the Indian army. Neither side revealed its battle plans to the other. The battle plans drafted by the Ministry of Defence and General Chaudhari, did not specify a role for the Indian Air Force in the order of battle. This attitude of Gen. Chaudhari was referred to by ACM Lal as the "Supremo Syndrome", a patronizing attitude sometimes held by the Indian army towards the other branches of the Indian Military.[52]

पाकिस्तान के गलत आकलन[संपादित करें]

The Pakistani Army's failures started with the supposition that a generally discontented Kashmiri people, given the opportunity provided by the Pakistani advance, would revolt against their Indian rulers, bringing about a swift and decisive surrender of Kashmir. The Kashmiri people, however, did not revolt. Instead, the Indian Army was provided with enough information to learn of Operation Gibraltar and the fact that the Army was battling not insurgents, as they had initially supposed, but Pakistani Army regulars.

चित्र:Mcconaughy20oct1965a.jpg
Telegram from the Embassy of the United States in Karachi: "Continuing propaganda regarding achievements of Pak forces seems to have convinced most that only Pak forbearance saved the Indians from disaster."

The Pakistani Army also failed to recognize that the Indian policy makers would order an attack on the southern sector in order to open a second theater of conflict. Pakistan was forced to dedicate troops to the southern sector to protect Sialkot and Lahore instead using them to support penetrating into Kashmir.

"Operation Grand Slam", which was launched by Pakistan to capture Akhnoor, a town north-east of Jammu and a key region for communications between Kashmir and the rest of India, was also a failure. Many Pakistani commentators criticized the Ayub Khan administration for being indecisive during Operation Grand Slam. These critics claim that the operation failed because Ayub Khan knew the importance of Akhnur to India (having called it India's "jugular vein") and did not want to capture it and drive the two nations into an all-out war. Despite progress being made in Akhnur, General Ayub Khan relieved the commanding Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik and replaced him with Gen. Yahya Khan. A 24-hour lull ensued the replacement, which allowed the Indian army to regroup in Akhnur and successfully oppose a lackluster attack headed by General Yahya Khan. "The enemy came to our rescue", asserted the Indian Chief of Staff of the Western Command. Later, Akhtar Hussain Malik criticized Ayub Khan for planning Operation Gibraltar, which was doomed to fail, and for relieving him of his command at a crucial moment in the war. Malik threatened to expose the truth about the war and the army's failure, but later dropped the idea for fear of being banned.[81]

Some authors have noted that Pakistan might have been emboldened by a war game – conducted in March 1965, at the Institute of Defence Analysis, USA. The exercise concluded that, in the event of a war with India, Pakistan would win.[82][83] Other authors like Stephen Philip Cohen, have consistently commented that the Pakistan Army had "acquired an exaggerated view of the weakness of both India and the Indian military... the 1965 war was a shock".[84]

Pakistani एयर मार्शलकमाण्डर इन चीफ of PAF during the war, नूर खान, later said thgnf fhfhfffhn Army, and not India, should be blamed for starting the war.[85][86] However propaganda in Pakistan about the war continued; the war was not rationally analyzed in Pakistan,[87][88] with most of the blame being heaped on the leadership and little importance given to intelligence failures that persisted until the debacle of the 1971 war, when then East Pakistan was invaded by India and seceded from West Pakistan, leading to the creation of Bangladesh. hghginj ujjjjfhffuhhh

अन्य देशों की Involvement[संपादित करें]

Pakistan and the United States had signed an Agreement of Cooperation in 1959 under which the United States agreed to take "appropriate action, including the use of armed forces" in order to assist the Government of Pakistan at its request.[89] However, following the start of the 1965 war, the United States was of the view that the conflict was largely Pakistan's fault and therefore, it cut all military supplies to the country.[60] However, Pakistan did receive significant support from Iran, Indonesia and People's Republic of China.[60]

Both before and during the war, the People's Republic of China had been a major military associate of Pakistan and had invariably admonished India, with whom it had fought a war in 1962. There were also reports of Chinese troop movements on the Indian border to support Pakistan.[90] As such, भारत agreed to the UN mandate in order to avoid a war on both borders.

India's participation in the Non-Aligned Movement yielded little support from its members. Despite close relations between with India, the Soviet Union was more neutral than most other nations during the war and even invited both nations to talks that it would host in Tashkent.[91][92]

युद्ध-पश्चात[संपादित करें]

भारत[संपादित करें]

Despite the declaration of a ceasefire, भारत was perceived as the victor due to its success in halting the Pakistan-backed insurgency in Kashmir.[93] In its October 1965 issue, the TIME magazine quoted a Western official assessing the consequences of the war[94] —

Now it's apparent to everybody that India is going to emerge as an Asian power in its own right.

In light of the failures of the Sino-Indian War, the outcome of the 1965 war was viewed as a "politico-strategic" victory in India. The Indian premier, Lal Bahadur Shastri, was hailed as a national hero in India.[95]

While the overall performance of the Indian military was praised, military leaders were criticized for their failure to effectively deploy India's superior armed forces so as to achieve a decisive victory over Pakistan.[96] In his book "War in the modern world since 1815", noted war historian Jeremy Black said that though Pakistan "lost heavily" during the 1965 war, भारत's hasty decision to call for negotiations prevented further considerable damage to the Pakistan Armed Forces. He elaborates[97] —

India's chief of army staff urged negotiations on the ground that they were running out ammunition and their number of tanks had become seriously depleted. In fact, the army had used less than 15% of its ammunition compared to Pakistan, which had consumed closer to 80 percent and India had double the number of serviceable tanks.

As a consequence, भारत focussed on enhancing communication and coordination within and among the triservices of the Indian Armed Forces. Partly as a result of the inefficient information gathering preceding the war, भारत established the Research and Analysis Wing for external espionage and intelligence. Major improvements were also made in command and control to address various shortcomings and the positive impact of these changes was clearly visible during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 when India achieved a decisive victory over Pakistan within two weeks.

China's repeated threats to intervene in the conflict in support of Pakistan increased pressure on the government to take an immediate decision to develop nuclear weapons.[98] Despite repeated assurances, the United States did little to prevent extensive use of American arms by Pakistani forces during the conflict which irked India.[99] At the same time, the United States and United Kingdom refused to supply India with sophisticated weaponry which further strained the relations between the West and India.[100] These developments led to a significant change in India's foreign policy — India, which had previously championed the cause of non-alignment, distanced itself further from Western powers and developed close relations with the Soviet Union. By the end of 1960s, the Soviet Union emerged as the biggest supplier of military hardware to India.[101] From 1967 to 1977, 81% of India's arms imports were from the Soviet Union.[102] After the 1965 war, the arms race between India and Pakistan became even more asymmetric and India was outdistancing Pakistan by far.[103]

पाकिस्तान[संपादित करें]

At the conclusion of the war, many Pakistanis considered the performance of their military to be positive. September 6 is celebrated as 'Defence Day' in Pakistan, in commemoration of the successful defence of Lahore against the Indian army. The performance of the Pakistani Air Force, in particular, was praised.

However, the Pakistani government was accused by foreign analysts of spreading disinformation among its citizens regarding the actual consequences of the war.[104] In his book "Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani foreign policies", S.M. Burke writes[62] —

After the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965 the balance of military power had decisively shifted in favor of India. Pakistan had found it difficult to replace the heavy equipment lost during that conflict while her adversary, despite her economic and political problems, had been determinedly building up her strength.

Most observers agree that the myth of a mobile, hard hitting Pakistan Army was badly dented in the war, as critical breakthroughs were not made.[105] Several Pakistani writers criticized the military's ill-founded belief that their "martial race" of soldiers could defeat "Hindu India" in the war.[106][107] Rasul Bux Rais, a Pakistani political analyst wrote[108] –

The 1965 war with India proved that Pakistan could neither break the formidable Indian defenses in a blitzkrieg fashion nor could she sustain an all-out conflict for long.

Moreover, Pakistan had lost more ground than it had gained during the war and, more importantly, failed to achieve its goal of occupying Kashmir; this result has been viewed by many impartial observers as a defeat for Pakistan.[109][110][111]

Many high ranking Pakistani officials and military experts later criticized the faulty planning of Operation Gibraltar that ultimately led to the war. The Tashkent declaration was also criticized in Pakistan, though few citizens realised the gravity of the situation that existed at the end of the war. Political leaders were also criticized. Following the advice of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan's foreign minister, Ayub Khan had raised very high expectations among the people of Pakistan about the superiority – if not invincibility – of its armed forces,[112] but Pakistan's inability to attain its military aims during the war, created a political liability for Ayub.[113] The defeat of its Kashmiri ambitions in the war led to the army's invincibility being challenged by an increasingly vocal opposition.[114]

One of the most far reaching consequences of the war was the wide-scale economic slowdown in Pakistan.[115][116] The cost of the 1965 war put an end to the impressive period economic growth Pakistan had experienced during early 1960s. Between 1964 and 1966, Pakistan's defence spending rose from 4.82% to 9.86% of GDP, putting tremendous strain on Pakistan's economy. By 1970–71, defence spending comprised a whopping 55.66% of government expenditure.[117]

Pakistan was surprised by the lack of support by the United States, an ally with whom the country had signed an Agreement of Cooperation. USA declared its neutrality in the war by cutting off military supplies to both sides,[13] leading Islamabad to believe that they were "betrayed" by the United States.[118] After the war, Pakistan would increasingly look towards China as a major source of military hardware and political support.

Another negative consequence of the war was the growing resentment against the Pakistani government in East Pakistan (present day Bangladesh),[84] particularly for West Pakistan's obsession with Kashmir.[119] Bengali leaders accused the central government of not providing adequate security for East Pakistan during the conflict, even though large sums of money were taken from the east to finance the war for Kashmir.[120] In fact, despite some Pakistan Air Force attacks being launched from bases in East Pakistan during the war, भारत did not retaliate in that sector,[121] although East Pakistan was defended only by an understrenghted infantry division (14 Division), sixteen planes and no tanks.[122] Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was critical of the disparity in military resources deployed in East and West Pakistan, calling for greater autonomy for East Pakistan, which ultimately led to the Bangladesh Liberation war and another war between India and Pakistan in 1971.

इन्हें भी देखें[संपादित करें]

सन्दर्भ[संपादित करें]

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  38. The Widening Gulf: Asian Nationalism and American Policy By Selig Seidenman Harrison Published 1978 Free Press, pp 269
  39. The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia By Devin T. Hagerty Page 70 Published by MIT Press
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  44. THE INDIAN END OF THE TELESCOPE India and Its Navy by Vice Admiral Gulab Hiranandani, भारतn Navy (Retired), Naval War College Review, Spring 2002, Vol. LV, No. 2
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  48. The Fighter Gap by Shoab Alam Khan in Defence Journal
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  107. An Analysis The Sepoy Rebellion of 1857–59 by AH Amin The army officers of that period were convinced that they were a martial race and the Hindus of Indian Army were cowards. This myth was largely disproved in 1965
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  121. Reflections on two military presidents By M.P. Bhandara December 25, 2005, Dawn
  122. The Pakistan Army From 1965 to 1971 Yahya Khan as Army Chief-1966-1971 by Maj (Retd) Agha Humayun Amin

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